the global insurgency that the US and its allies face today and will face in the future. Rather than having the lead in COIN, the military should be an equal partner to the diplomatic, informational and economic elements of power.
THE OTHER SIDE OF COIN
This paper will explore the past and current US COIN doctrine and will demonstrate the need for full interagency integration of COIN efforts. In addition, this paper will recommend options for "leveling the interagency playing field" in relations to winning the Global War on Terror.
The US Government has faced insurgencies since its inception, yet has forgotten the value of incorporating and synchronizing all elements of power in order to develop effective counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Instead, the US national Security Strategy relies primarily on military forces and sometimes adds "token" diplomatic, informational, or economic efforts. Until The US uses a truly integrated approach to COIN that applies equally to all elements of power, the US will not defeat twenty-first century insurgencies.
The United States is no stranger to insurgency, yet when one mentions counterinsurgency, the image of conflict in Iraq immediately comes to mind. By definition, an insurgency is "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict" The founding fathers quickly, although reluctantly, identified the need for an insurgency to gain outside support. As early as February 1776, John Adams recognized the importance of forming an alliance with France and Spain, even ahead of "declaring independency" 2 Interestingly enough, the "insurgency "of 1776, was not the first time citizens of colonial America rose to insurrection.
Between the years of 1645 and 1775, there were eighteen insurrections and 119 riots against the established government. 3 During those ninety years, some colonists began to understand the importance of the elements of power. It was during the 1980s that the US engaged in an effective counterinsurgency program within Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and El Salvador known as the "three 'As' (aid, advice, and arms)." 13 These three "As" were essentially operations that did not directly involve military operations and offered valuable lessons learned that were forgotten twenty years later.
After El Salvador, US tenets of COIN followed the three "As" model focusing less on military and more on other elements. Then national strategy focus shifted. The cold war ended, the US and its coalition partners had won Desert Shield/Desert Storm in a spectacular manner, and by September 11, 2001 the valuable COIN lessons learned in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and El Salvador were either forgotten or neglected.
In fact, it has been said that most Army officers knew more about the American Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. 14 Unfortunately not only had Army officers not learned the "best practices" of COIN, but the leaders within other agencies seemed to have quickly forgotten or never learned them either as evidenced by the ineffective efforts of Operation Restore Hope and the failed attempt to capture Mohammed Farah Aidid in Somalia during the early 1990s.
Operation Restore Hope was a US led-U.N. military operation supported by Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic elements (DIME) of power.
The objective was to save a starving nation and disarm the insurgents that stole the food from the general population. However, from a US perspective it was a military operation first-supported by a secret diplomatic mission. This was a prime example of how not to conduct COIN.
In a typical post-El Salvador fashion, there was no coordination between the military element and the diplomatic element. In fact, during Operation
Restore Hope before and during the Battle of Mogadishu while Task Force
Ranger was attempting to capture Aidid and his cohorts, the Clinton Administration developed a plan to negotiate with Aidid unbeknownst to DoD. 15 The lack of a comprehensive COIN doctrine became readily apparent . There are two weaknesses with this concept; first, the way this paragraph is written, makes it plain that the military effort and the civilian effort are still not one and the same.
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In order to promote true unity of effort this must change. Secondly, an office within the DoS is the right location for such a function; however, its focus is too narrow. By taking it a step further and making it the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Counterinsurgency, it could coordinate all counterinsurgency operations.
Obviously there are times when military action must remain the prioritybut a linkage with the other elements must remain. This is primarily true when insurgents take on a more conventional warfare strategy. 17 What is critical is the recognition of the fact-to paraphrase Ralph Peters-that Clausewitz's statement that "war is simply a continuation of policy with other means" never was true for the United States. Instead, Peters strongly argues that for the US, war means that policy failed. Peters goes on to say that-"[e]lsewhere, the competition between governments, cultures, civilizations, and religions is viewed as comprehensive and unceasing, and it is waged-instinctively or consciously-with all the available elements of power… The conundrum is that our military strength makes our policy-makers lazy. Neglectful of other instruments and means of national power, they inevitably find themselves forced to resort to military solutions." 18 The bottom line is that the US approach to COIN must change sooner rather than later, and with the current administration's approach to "Overseas Contingency Operations" now is as good a time as any.
To better understand the requirements of DIME COIN, and in order to succeed in today's environment, one must first understand how insurgencies have changed during the twenty-first century.
Since the end of World War Two, the world has seen constant conflict. In fact, according to Bard E. O'Neill, there are approximately eight wars going on around the globe at any given time and most of these conflicts are insurgencies. 19 As O'Neill also states, insurgencies are not new, in fact they date back to early recorded history and nations such as Rome dealt with insurgencies regularly.
There are also many reasons for insurgencies. These insurgency catalysts range from weak central government, class struggle, religion, cultural differences, governments led by a differing group than the insurgents, or economic reasons.
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Within an Insurgency there are essentially three stages; 1) the political stage-this is the establishment of legitimacy or the right to speak for the people, 2) destruction of the current government and the insurgency becoming the government, and 3) military action. , it appears that his strategy is not that much different from President Bush's. 37 In fact, with the Obama Administration's focus on Afghanistan and a relook at Pakistan, he is demonstrating that the change that was promised is simply more of the same. 38 The US must learn to incorporate DIME into COIN sooner rather than later and now is an opportune time to make the required changes and as the President Obama Administration passes its 100 th day in office, it is obvious that this change is becoming more and more unlikely. This is unfortunate because But with the current global environment, and the fact that no other nation can currently stand up to the US militarily, the need for these future combat systems is not an immediate issue. In fact, given the level of conventional threat and an integration of interagency COIN operations, it is possible to reduce and reorganize the ground forces in order to provide flexibility and still meet any large scale threat while better responding to the unconventional threat. 41 This would afford another, although unpopular means to gain funding to support DIME COIN. The paradigm shift here is to recognize that DoD, until the publication of FM 3-24, has long held that "…armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones." 42 This is no longer the case and the idea of continuing to fund DoD to win battles rather than wars through the continuous funding of expensive "hi-tech" systems must transition to the holistic method of an interagency COIN process and the recognition that sometimes the best weapons on the planet are sometimes good enough. 43 Yet opponents of this argument will say that there is no need to fully integrate DIME into COIN and they will cite the success the military has seen during the surge in Iraq. Although the military has done an extraordinary job in
Iraq and the COIN environment there, they have done so at what cost?
The other thing to keep in mind is that this is a global issue and there are other players. Initiating a proper national COIN strategy will help in changing the US image across (the rational part of) the globe. The other positive outcome of a true interagency process is that it reduces the complexity during a crisis since there is unity of effort as well as unity of command. 45 In addition, FM 3-24 recognizes that legitimacy of the host nation as well as security of the civilian populace are other key ingredients 46 to the 15 equation and will aid in changing the image of the US from a conquering occupation force to one that uses the military only for protection of the populaceand only until host nation forces can assume the security role-while civilian organizations are conducting the higher profile missions. 47 Legitimacy of government and security of the populace are also critical because victory in COIN begins from within the affected nation/state. But this becomes problematic as many states, as evidenced by Iraq, may take years to stabilize themselves both economically and administratively. Obviously there are challenges to address when discussing DIME COIN, but it is the way ahead and these challenges are not insurmountable-although some may be unpopular. During this economically challenged period, every agency will want to hang on to the budgets they have and will not want to discuss paradigm shifts, but it is time to make the changes. FM 3-24 recognizes the need to integrate DIME into COIN as does DoS to a lesser degree, but the resources must back it up.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Some recommendations for integrating DIME into COIN are as follows:
The National Security Strategy (NSS) must reflect an integrated DIME Bilateral support is crucial unless the US is willing to accept that it will remain unpopular and perceived as an imperialistic hegemon. COIN efforts are best served when there is a strong multi-lateral coalition involved as is evidenced by Bosnia and Kosovo. 56 The risk of incorporating DIME into COIN is probably moderate at best. This is primarily due to the significant paradigm shift and the need for some departments of the US government to relinquish resources to other departments and the parochialism within those departments and the reluctance to change. If DIME COIN is not fully embraced, the second and third order effects could result in even less efficiency and an increased level of parochial walls between departments than are currently in place. It will take strong leadership at all levels to make this work, however, once institutionalized, operations will be more efficient.
CONCLUSION
The path forward is clear; the US must incorporate and synchronize all elements of power into the counterinsurgency fight. By using the 80-20 split identified by David Galula, 20% of the counterinsurgency fight is up to the military while the rest belongs to the political piece, to include the economic and information elements. In concert with this, the US populace must understand that the global insurgency will take time to defeat and the populace must get out of the "sound-bite culture" in order to ensure continued success. This will require an even larger piece of the information element to get engaged at the home front.
The role of information must expand even beyond the home front and the affected host nations. Due to the internet, and instant media coverage, there are serious challenges ahead in the information realm. This is also true in the element of economics, with the current economic crisis. Not only does the US face a challenge in funding COIN, but the host nations will find themselves stretched even thinner as a result of declining revenue.
The key to winning in COIN is applying a synergistic approach that truly incorporates all elements of DIME appropriately. This is the only sure way of winning a COIN operation.
